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Abstract
‘Popular’, ‘culture’ and ‘folk’ are discussed by Raymond Williams as highly charged 
keywords: semantically, historically and from the point of view of the various areas of 
research which have adopted them in their denominations. The elusive character of 
these terms is reflected in the many problems we encounter when exploring the field 
of popular culture studies. In particular, since the 1980s, neo-Marxist cultural studies 
historians have claimed the label of ‘popular culture’ for the sole study of post-industrial 
commercial phenomena. This exclusive identification and the comparative disregard of 
research on pre-industrial popular cultures has become a doxa in the so called ‘cultural 
studies approach’ and has also affected the field of Shakespearean studies, where ‘popu-
lar’ is almost exclusively connected with the ‘afterlife’ of Shakespeare’s plays and their 
appropriation by the modern media. This article discusses what has been considered an 
‘elision of the past’ performed in many recent studies, at the same time suggesting that 
socio-historical research on the pre-industrial and pre-commercial culture of ‘the people’ 
implies the reading of entirely different ‘texts’ and their different mode of transmission 
than the study of modern and late modern manifestations of ‘popular’ commercial 
products and their reception; and that, therefore, it requires the adoption of entirely 
different paradigms and methods of analysis. 
Keywords: Culture, People, Popular Culture, Sources, Transmission.
1. Definitions and Questions
Introducing his essay ‘Notes on Deconstructing “the Popular” ’, Stuart Hall 
says: ‘… I want to tell you some of the difficulties I have with the term “popu-
lar”. I have almost as many problems with “popular” as I have with “culture”. 
When you put the two terms together, the difficulties can be pretty horrendous’ 
(1981, 227). Yet, what Hall means by ‘popular’ in connection with ‘culture’ is 
soon clear. Popular culture, he says, ‘looks, in any particular period, at those 
forms and activities which have their roots in the social and material condi-
tions of particular classes; which have been embodied in popular traditions 
and practices’ (234-235). He sees the field of such forms and activities as 
permanently oscillating between containment and resistance, because they are 
permanently involved in ‘a continuous and necessarily uneven and unequal 
struggle, by the dominant culture, constantly to disorganise and reorganise 
popular culture; to enclose and confine its definitions and forms within a 
more inclusive range of dominant forms’ (233). But Hall also tackles the is-
sue of periodization, and chooses as the period to be examined in the study 
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of popular culture the years which go from the 1880s to the 1920s because 
that period, he says, ‘is one of the real test cases for the revived interest in 
popular culture’, but mainly because of the expression, in those decades, of 
the relationship of the dominated class ‘to a major restructuring of capital’, 
that is, ‘to a changing set of material relations and conditions’ (230, 229-230). 
Thus, the object of study is defined by confining it to the emergence of 
industrialization and the urbanization of an industrial working class, that is, 
not earlier than the late eighteenth century. Hall, however, goes farther than 
exposing and motivating his preference for the decades which go from the 
1880s to the 1920s; he also expresses reservations about the study of earlier 
phenomena and forms:
Without in any way casting aspersions on the important historical work which has 
been done and remains to do on earlier periods, I do believe that many of the real 
difficulties (theoretical as well as empirical) will only be confronted when we begin to 
examine closely popular culture in a period which begins to resemble our own, which 
poses the same kind of interpretive problems as our own, and which is informed by 
our own sense of contemporary questions. (231)
In an essay which I will discuss later, L.W. Levine (1992) seems to have no 
doubts about the object of study of what goes under the name of ‘popular 
culture’: it is the study of the cultural products which were distributed to ‘the 
people’ during the Great Depression and after and of the way in which the 
addressees responded to these consumption products. In even more unam-
biguous terms, in a more recent essay, John Storey seems to radically exclude 
the possibility of research in the popular culture of past ages: ‘whatever else 
popular culture might be’, he says, ‘it is definitely a culture that only emerged 
following industrialization and urbanization’ (2001, 13).
Raymond Williams, in turn, included both ‘culture’ and ‘popular’ among 
the keywords he explored. His exploration of the word ‘culture’ starts with 
the assertion that ‘Culture is one of the two or three most complicated words 
in the English language’. He, then, adds that ‘This is so partly because of its 
intricate historical development, in several European languages, but mainly 
because it has now come to be used for important concepts in several distinct 
intellectual disciplines and in several distinct and incompatible systems of 
thought’ (1985, 87). Two other passages in his historical and conceptual ex-
ploration of the word seem to me to be worth quoting because they illustrate 
points which I am going to develop in this article. The first is a quotation 
from Herder’s Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind (1784-91). 
Herder, Williams says, wrote of Kultur that ‘nothing is more indeterminate 
than this word, and nothing more deceptive than its application to all nations 
and periods’ (89; my italics); the second is Williams’s own reflection on the 
different ways in which different disciplines or points of view characterize the 
contents of the word ‘culture’:
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… in archaeology and in cultural anthropology the reference to culture or a culture 
is primarily to material production, while in history and cultural studies the refer-
ence is primarily to signifying or symbolic systems. This often confuses but even more 
often conceals the central question of the relations between ‘material’ and ‘symbolic’ 
production, which … have always to be related rather than contrasted. (91)1
Of ‘popular’, Williams registers favourable, unfavourable and neutral meanings 
and comments on two uses of the expression ‘popular culture’ saying that it ‘was 
not identified by the people but by others, and it still carries two older senses: 
inferior kinds of work … and work deliberately setting out to win favour’. In 
the treatment of the same word, we find yet another statement which illustrates 
a conceptual difference between what is meant by ‘folk culture’ and ‘popular 
culture’ in the English-speaking world: ‘The sense of popular culture as the 
culture actually made by people for themselves ... relates, evidently, to Herder’s 
sense of Kultur des Volkes, ... but what came through in English as folk-culture 
... is distinguishable from recent senses of popular culture as contemporary as 
well as historical’ (237). Herder’s Kultur des Volkes, Williams seems to be say-
ing, refers to cultural forms originating ‘from below’; an idea which – in more 
recent senses of ‘popular culture’ adopted in English – is considered out-dated 
and residual. ‘Folk’ also appears as one of Williams’s keywords, with observa-
tions which further explain the ideal divide between ‘folk’ and ‘popular’ in the 
English-speaking world. Owing to its use by eighteenth-century folklorists such 
as Herder and the Grimm brothers, ‘folklore’ ended up by being ‘centred on the 
sense of “survivals” ’; a similar residual meaning, then, started to be attributed, 
for instance, to the term ‘folksong’, which 
came to be influentially specialized to the pre-industrial, pre-urban, pre-literate world, 
though popular songs, including new industrial work songs, were still being actively 
produced. Folk, in this period, had the effect of backdating all elements of popular 
culture, and was often offered as a contrast with modern popular forms, either of a 
radical and working-class or of a commercial kind. (137)2 
Often quoted broader definitions of ‘culture’ are those by Clifford Geertz 
and Peter Burke. Geertz says that his idea of culture ‘has neither multiple 
referents nor, so far as I can see, any unusual ambiguity’. Culture, for Geertz, 
‘denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, 
a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of 
which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about 
and attitudes toward life’ (2000, 89). Burke’s definition of ‘culture’ refers to 
‘a system of shared meanings, attitudes and values, and the symbolic forms 
(performances, artifacts) in which they are expressed or embodied’; ‘popular 
culture’, Burke says, ‘is perhaps best defined ... in a negative way as unofficial 
culture, the culture of the non-elite, the “subordinate classes” as Gramsci 
called them’ (1994, xi).
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The definitions and evaluations I have been quoting may appear rather 
random, especially since they extend over a period from 1976 (the date of 
publication of the first edition of Williams’s book) to 2001, when John Storey’s 
book was published. However, they illustrate problems and theoretical stum-
bling-blocks which still clutter the field or fields in which the study of popular 
culture is practised. These problems and stumbling-blocks are the issues I am 
going to discuss in the following pages. I am thinking, in particular, about a 
theoretical hypotext which runs under the surface of statements produced in 
the area of cultural studies when popular culture is the object of reflection: i.e. 
the fact that, while (rightly) affirming that interest in ‘the people’ started to 
manifest itself in the later eighteenth century, certain scholars seem not to be 
willing to consider the possibility of going back beyond that time in the study 
of phenomena which developed in a ‘popular’ context. Furthermore, the fact 
of considering only the industrial, urban and literate world worthy of reflec-
tion and examination has produced the side effect of asserting a vision of ‘the 
people’ in which they are simply (active) consumers and consequently ruling 
out a view of the people as possible producers of at least scraps of culture of 
their own. This theoretical option, furthermore, has ended up by producing 
a series of contradictions. While, on the one hand, analysts cannot ‘deny the 
exploitative, manipulative tendencies of certain branches of the media and 
cultural industries, such as tabloid journalism, advertising and online porn’ 
(a perspective which is present when the Gramscian formula ‘hegemonic/
subaltern’ is evoked), they must ‘give credit to, and place critical value on, 
the various resignifications and reactivations undertaken by audiences and 
consumers’ (Pickering 2010, xxii; my italics).3 
2. Popular/Folk
Reflecting on ‘folk’, Raymond Williams also discusses one of the word’s uses, 
that recorded in a letter which, in 1846, J.M. Thoms addressed to the journal 
Atheneum. In it, Thoms gave a ‘specializing’ definition of ‘What we in England 
designate as Popular Antiquities, or popular literature’, saying that ‘it ... would 
be most aptly described by a good Saxon compound, Folk-Lore – the Lore of the 
People’ (187). Williams, then, writes that the Old English word lar, from which 
lore derives, ‘had originally been used in a range of meanings from teaching 
and education to learning and scholarship’, but from the eighteenth century 
had become ‘specialized to the past, with the associated senses of “traditional” 
or “legendary” ’ (136). If we recall that, commenting on the word popular, 
Williams quotes Herder’s sense of the expression ‘Kultur des Volkes’ as different 
from what in England are ‘recent senses of popular culture’ (237), we find 
a historical explanation of the fact that, in the English-speaking world, ‘folk 
culture’ and ‘popular culture’ ended up by designating different phenomena 
of a different nature, at the same time acquiring different connotations as to 
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the perspective from which they have been studied in time: while ‘folk culture’ 
came to be described (especially in the field of cultural studies) as a set of values 
and perspectives, now residual, tinged with the regressive aura of romantic 
nationalism and nostalgia, the expression ‘popular culture’ has acquired, again 
thanks to the ‘cultural studies’ turn, a progressive aura because it is used to 
refer to the post-industrial and post-capitalist context. In treatments of ‘folk 
culture’ in this perspective, Herder is invariably quoted, together with the 
Grimm brothers and other collectors of folk songs and tales, as exalting the 
values of nationalism and the Nation and as sharing the stigma attributed to 
the romantics, that of dreaming ‘of a return to the simple virtues of nature as 
a means to combat and overcome the artificiality and savagery of urban and 
industrial life’ (Storey 2003, 9). 
In an article in which he surveys the relationships between history 
and folklore, Peter Burke distinguishes three phases in their development: 
the first, which he defines as ‘the age of harmony’, approximately from the 
mid-nineteenth century until the 1920s; the second, defined as ‘the age of 
suspicion’, stretching until the 1970s; and the third, the one we are living 
in, defined as ‘the age of rapprochement’. About the present age, he records, 
starting around the 1970s, the emergence of a new awareness of social his-
torians ‘linked to the rediscovery of popular culture and the rise of “history 
from below” ’ (2004, 136); and argues that
The rise of social history in the 1960s prepared the way for collaboration, especially 
when it took the form of ‘microhistory’ or the history of everyday life, or ‘historical 
anthropology’. The ‘cultural turn’ on the part of historians has also facilitated the 
rapprochement, especially the increasing interest in the history of material culture as 
part of the history of everyday life. (137)
However, if this is true when we consider the work of historians like Burke 
himself, or Jacques Le Goff, or Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie and others which 
are mentioned in Burke’s article as artificers of the rapprochement, when read-
ing certain statements of historians working in the field of cultural studies one 
has the impression that research on the (popular) cultures of the past, i.e. on 
those cultures which were not yet touched by the impact of industrialization 
and urbanization, is judged as nostalgia for a ‘world we have lost’. In other 
words, that a new form of ‘suspicion’, which started about the 1980s and 
is still active today, tends to infect the field of cultural history from within.
Storey’s idea about (all?) the collectors of folk culture is that they ‘idealized 
the past in order to condemn the present’ (2003, 10). However, reading treat-
ments of the issue of popular culture by scholars working in the field of cultural 
studies (the so called ‘cultural studies approach’ to popular culture), one has 
the impression that these scholars almost invariably tend to idealize the present 
(i.e., the industrialization and urbanization era) in order to condemn the past.4 
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Indeed, as Barry Reay has remarked, ‘A curious thing has happened – is happen-
ing – in modern studies of popular culture: the elision of the past’, that is, ‘the 
relative neglect – in case studies, cited authorities, discussed methodologies, and 
theoretical genuflections – of histories and historians of the period before the 
late nineteenth century’ (1998, 221). Reay goes on to say that ‘representations 
of the early modern cultures that we have lost are light years away from the 
consumer cultures of late-twentieth-century popular culture, the images (visual 
and aural) of advertising, film, TV, clothing, record, photograph, computer and 
material possession’. His treatment of this aspect is unfortunately limited to the 
last three pages of his book, where he suggests that ‘Those interested in popular 
cultures today can surely benefit from an awareness that the complex cultural 
interactions of the past ... might have explanatory value for the present’; and 
concludes by suggesting that ‘Practitioners of cultural studies should remedy 
history’s absent presence’ (222-223).5 The brief treatment which Reay devotes 
to the deep divide between the study of the popular culture of the old times 
(whatever times) and that of modern and late modern times, then, suggests 
and encourages better communication and interaction between studies which 
he sees as belonging to the same area of interest and, perhaps, to the same dis-
cipline. But is this really arguable? Should the difference (which is a difference 
in the objects of study, in their diverse contexts and in the kind of ‘texts’ which 
have transmitted them) be deleted or even smoothed over by assuming that 
‘a perspective on the history of culture longer than that of the modern world 
might have some relevance to interpretations of modernity and post-modernity’ 
(223)? To this cluster of issues I will return later.
In the pages that follow, I will discuss certain questions which the literary 
historian must face when dealing with the analysis of texts and their relationship 
with ‘popular culture’; questions which inevitably receive a partial answer if the 
literary historian fails to encounter the point of view of the social historian. In 
order to grasp something of this point of view, I will therefore attempt to venture 
into the field of social history temporarily setting aside the tools of my trade. 
But, although I will not deal with any literary considerations on Shakespeare’s 
work and its relationship with popular culture, I have a general point of view 
to express on this issue: the conviction that even in a work as elitist as the plays 
of the most celebrated poet and playwright ever, elements may be found which 
connect it to a world of values and symbols of the ‘popular’ components of its 
contemporary society.6 Furthermore, by stating the possibility of a connection 
between the work of a celebrated poet and playwright and the values and symbols 
of the ‘popular culture’ of his age (later on in this article I will, on occasion, get 
rid of the inverted commas), I am implying that the confines between differently 
oriented and differently engendered kinds and manifestations of culture are, to 
say the least, very thin; and that more often than not they tend to disappear. In 
other words, I am convinced that ‘any discussion of Shakespeare’s relationship 
with popular culture must necessarily recognize that outside as well as within 
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his plays themselves, the popular interacts with the elite in terms of audience, 
genre, and value systems or beliefs’; and indeed that ‘there is throughout Shake-
speare’s work an interweaving of high and low cultural forms which ultimately 
defines the nature of his drama and of his distinctive achievement as a writer’ 
(Gillespie and Rhodes, 2006, 11).
3. Created By the People/Created For the People 
In 1992 The American Historical Review published an issue devoted to popular 
culture. The volume was introduced by a long article by L.W. Levine, to which 
other scholars were invited to respond.7 The discussion was closed by another 
article by Levine who briefly responded to the others’ comments. 
Levine’s article, which opens the forum, was entitled ‘The Folklore of 
Industrial Society: Popular Culture and Its Audiences’. This title illustrates the 
author’s intention ‘to explore the degree to which popular culture functions 
in ways similar to folk culture and acts as a form of folklore for people living 
in urban industrial societies, and can thus be used to reconstruct people’s at-
titudes, values, and reactions’ (1992, 1372). This article, however, represents 
a determined shift away from a consideration of folklore values as produced 
by the folk. Popular culture, in Levine’s definition, is ‘culture that is popular; 
culture that is widely accessible and widely accessed; widely disseminated, 
and widely viewed or heard or read’. With reference to the years of the Great 
Depression in America, this definition, Levine acknowledges, applies also to 
‘what we call mass culture since it was disseminated throughout the nation 
by such centralized mechanisms as national magazines, syndicated newspaper 
features, Hollywood studios, network radio, Tin Pan Alley, and commercial 
publishing houses’.8 Starting from the assertion that in those years ‘not eve-
rything mass produced for the American people was popular’, Levine argues 
against those critics and scholars whose ‘aesthetic hubris ... has allowed the 
automatic equation of mass culture with popular culture as if everything mass 
produced was popular’ (1373). His main contention, then, is that the receiv-
ers of mass culture (those people for whom certain mass-produced cultural 
objects were created and commercialized) in the period and in the context 
examined could discriminate and distinguish, that they could accept but also 
reject these products, thereby in certain ways influencing the cultural market 
by asserting the format of their own culture. The first and most important of 
the contentions around which the essay is organized is the rejection of ‘the 
image of the purely passive mass audience ready to absorb, consciously and 
unconsciously, whatever ideological message those controlling the mass culture 
industry want to feed them’ (1374). People, in short, ‘did not passively accept 
whatever popular culture was thrown in their way’, for ‘they preselected the 
culture they exposed themselves to by learning to decipher reviews and coming 
attractions, by understanding the propensities of authors, actors, and directors 
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to whose work they had been exposed in the past, and by consulting members 
of their communities’ (1380). In short, the status of mass-culture receivers 
must be converted from that of passive consumers to that of active users.
I agree with some of the objections which were advanced by other partici-
pants in the forum. In particular, I share Robin Kelly’s remark that the main 
actors in the chain of actions which ends with the consumption of products, 
namely, the producers (and their intent) are almost completely absent from 
Levine’s treatment; Kelly accepts the idea that ‘the folk’ in the industrial society 
were not a passive audience ready to accept whatever products were thrown in 
their way; but he also, rightly I believe, argues that ‘a cultural studies approach 
... would explore the ways in which audiences, through their own agency, both 
challenge and reproduce the dominant ideology’ and that we must ‘acknowledge 
that the “people” were largely relegated to the receiving end, and, in that capacity, 
they made choices under circumstances not of their own choosing’ (1992, 1408).
Natalie Zemon Davis, in turn, although agreeing with Levine’s vision of 
consumers as ‘active users’, directs attention to the users of past centuries at the 
same time arguing for a consideration of margins, the ‘blurring of boundaries 
between cultural typologies’ and therefore to the mixed cultural models and 
their cultural interaction; certain innovations in forms and motifs, Davis 
argues, ‘may have come from local invention but also from manuscripts or 
peddlers’ books read aloud by the parish priest’ (1992, 1410); and this kind 
of mixture can be predicated both for the peasants of early modern Europe 
and for the workers of modern times. In short, ‘the “people” may be among 
the makers in some fashion, as well as among the consumers’ (1413). Further-
more, without explicitly criticizing the absence, in Levine’s article, of relevant 
previous studies, some of which were the first to plead for a role of modern 
audiences as ‘active receivers’, when she first mentions the ‘historians of late 
medieval and early modern Europe’ (1409), Davis aptly adds a long footnote 
where the prominent figures in this field of study, herself included (together 
with Robert Mandrou, Robert Muchembled, Carlo Ginzburg, Michel de 
Certeau, Roger Chartier and others), are mentioned. In particular, Certeau 
and, after him, Chartier, were the first to systematically direct attention to 
the usage which consumers make of the cultural products they are exposed 
to – that is, to the ‘poetics’ expressed by the ways in which the products im-
posed by the economic system are appropriated and used by their audiences.9 
It was Michel de Certeau who systematically and extensively drew at-
tention to users and the tactics and practices by which they appropriate the 
products imposed on them by the economic system. The purpose of his book 
L’invention du quotidien, published in 1980 and, in particular, of the first 
volume, entitled Arts de faire, is 
to make explicit the systems of operational combination (les combinatoires d’opération) which 
also compose a ‘culture’, and to bring to light the models of action characteristic of users 
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whose status as the dominated element in society (a status that does not mean that they are 
either passive or docile) is concealed by the euphemistic term ‘consumers’. (1984, xi-xii)10
The consumers’ action is a ‘poiēsis’, a bricolage, a ‘making’, which represents the 
user’s active intervention on the products imposed by the economic system. A 
telling example of ‘poiēsis’ given by Certeau in the introduction of his book is:
For instance, the ambiguity that subverted from within the Spanish colonizers’ ‘success’ 
in imposing their own culture on the indigenous Indians is well known. Submissive, 
and even consenting to their subjection, the Indians nevertheless often made of the 
rituals, representations, and laws imposed on them something quite different from 
what their conquerors had in mind; they subverted them not by rejecting or altering 
them, but by using them with respect to ends and references foreign to the system 
they had no choice but to accept ... their use of the dominant social order deflected 
its power, which they lacked the means to challenge. (xiii)11 
Central to Certeau’s argument are the notions of ‘strategy’ and ‘tactic’. Unduly 
simplifying the author’s fascinating treatment of these concepts, one may say 
that strategies are those which are deployed by a subject of will and power which 
occupies a place in a system of social, economic and political relationships: in 
other words, a strategy is that produced by a dominating rationality. A tactic, 
on the contrary, is that which is practised without relying on a proper place, but 
on a space which is controlled by the other. ‘Many everyday practices (talking, 
reading, moving about, shopping, cooking, etc.) are tactical in character. And 
so are, more generally, many “ways of operating”: victories of the “weak” over 
the “strong” ... maneuvers, polymorphic simulations, joyful discoveries, poetic 
as well as warlike’. Such ‘clever tricks’ are what the Greeks called mētis, and are 
similar to ‘the intelligence displayed in the tricks and imitations of plants and 
fishes. From the depths of the ocean to the streets of modern megalopolies there 
is a continuity and permanence in these tactics’ (xix-xx). 
This is obviously not the place to deal in detail with the book’s engaging 
treatment of these issues;12 however, one point of Certeau’s analysis is relevant 
to my concerns here. 
Contrasting what he calls ‘the enigma of the consumer-sphynx’, that is, 
the idea that consumers simply absorb passively whatever is distributed to them 
by the strategies of presiding institutions, Certeau again quotes the example of 
the tactics devised by the indigenous to divert Spanish colonization ‘from its 
intended aims’ (31) and also invokes as a relevant model that of language and 
the Saussurian distinction between langue and parole. The linguistic model, he 
says, offers ‘on the one hand, a stock of materials, on the other, transactions 
and users’. Similarly, ‘in the case of consumption, one could almost say that 
production furnishes the capital and that users, like renters, acquire the right to 
operate on and with this fund without owning it’. The same kind of appropriation 
which is made with the use of language (by fashioning in certain ways the act 
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of enunciation and its product, as argued by Benveniste), according to Certeau, 
consumers perform in all the non-linguistic practices of everyday life (32-33). 
From one point of view, that of an observer of the uncontrollable invasiveness 
and aggressiveness of late modern strategies, Certeau’s defence of the active usage 
and bricolage performed by consumers, his faith in the ‘clever tricks of the “weak” 
within the order established by the “strong” ’ (40), may appear utopian; on the 
other hand, however, his model may also appear reductive and ungenerous. It 
is true that consumption is refigured by Certeau as a form of production, but it 
can only figure as an ancillary form of production because it cannot but await 
the initiative of the ‘strong’ to start appropriating it. Furthermore, even a form 
of production as that envisaged by Certeau is reductive if applied to situations 
(in the past?) in which ‘the people’ presumably did more than react or creatively 
appropriate in a particular way what was given them. In other words, as Davis 
says, ‘the “people” may be among the makers in some fashion, as well as among 
the consumers’ (1992, 1413). This particular point of the theory poses an often 
repeated question in studies of popular culture: are we talking about culture 
created for the people or by the people? 
Roger Chartier is clear on this point: the alternative created for/created by 
is for him a false problem. Following in the wake of Certeau’s ideas, he says that 
To ask whether ‘popular’ is merely what the people create or what is designed for them 
is to mistake the character of the problem we face. Cultural consumption, whether 
popular or not, is at the same time a form of production, which creates ways of using 
that cannot be limited to the intentions of those who produce. (1984, 234)
In other words, all cultural practices, not only those performed by ‘the people’, 
manifest themselves as creative appropriation; and indeed, Chartier questions 
the possibility ‘to describe such-and-such cultural form as “popular” ’ and 
the practice of identifying ‘popular culture by describing a certain number 
of corpora (sets of texts, gestures, and beliefs)’ (229).13
In a more recent essay, Chartier briefly discusses the attitudes which have 
characterised the study of popular culture in the perspective of the so-called 
‘new cultural history’ and in particular the debate about the relationship be-
tween popular and elite culture. He sees two models which have characterised 
this study: on the one hand ‘la culture populaire est pensée comme autonome, 
indépendente, fermée sur elle-même’; on the other, ‘elle est entièrement définie 
par sa distance vis-à-vis de la légitimité culturelle’. In the development of this 
argument, we encounter another statement connected with the alternative cre-
ated for/created by; that is, a challenge of what Chartier sees, in both the perspec-
tives illustrated above, as a mistaken opposition ‘entre l’âge d’or d’une culture 
populaire libre et vigoureuse et les temps des censures et des contraintes qui la 
condamnent et la démantèlent’. He finds this tendency expressed in a similar 
manner by historians of the Middle Ages who see in the thirteenth century ‘une 
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acculturation chrétienne destructrice des traditions de la culture populaire laïque’ 
of the preceding centuries and by twentieth-century historians who attribute to 
the advent of mass culture imposed by the new media the same dismantlement 
of the old oral culture. ‘Le veritable problème’, Chartier concludes, ‘n’est donc 
pas de dater la disparition irrémédiable d’une culture dominée, par example en 
1600 ou 1650, mais de comprendre comment, à chaque époque, se nouent les 
rapports complexes entre des formes imposées, plus ou moins contraignantes, 
et des idées sauvegardées, plus ou moins altérées’ (2003, 7).14 
In the passages quoted above, Chartier challenges certain points of view 
which, for many social historians, have constituted, and probably still con-
stitute for some, firm guidelines for a diachronic reading of cultural forms 
and their development. In particular, he challenges the idea that certain great 
fractures in the European socio-cultural landscape (the obvious ones are the 
Reformation and Counter-Reformation and the advent of industrialization) 
determined a contraction of the people’s cultural spaces and therefore of the 
cultural initiative which came from below; and that, consequently, the same 
fractures and cultural mutations impinged on the vitality and also noncon-
formity of the people’s cultural undertaking. Abandoning these consolidated 
paradigms, and consequently the idea that a ‘golden age’ of popular creati- 
vity ended up by being constrained by these events and fractures, he seems 
to embrace the idea that, in all times and contexts, the role of the people was 
that of (active) consumers. But, however suggestive and subtly argued his 
hypothesis may be, the equally convincing narrative of other social historians, 
which differs from the Certeau-Chartier line of thought, cannot be ignored.
Peter Burke illustrates the process of withdrawal of the elite from the culture 
of the people and the growing chasm between the two cultures during the period 
from 1500 to 1800 and for which, at two different moments, two forces were 
mainly responsible: the clergy and the Reformers – both in the Protestant and in 
Catholic contexts – and the social and economic changes determined by the com-
mercialization and industrialization of society. Introducing his treatment of the ways 
in which the progressive division of the two cultures was brought about, he says: 
In 1500 ... popular culture was everyone’s culture; a second culture for the educated, 
and the only culture for everyone else. By 1800, however, in most parts of Europe, 
the clergy, the nobility, the merchants, the professional men – and their wives – had 
abandoned popular culture to the lower classes, from whom they were now separated, 
as never before, by profound differences in world view. (1994, 270)15 
Burke also devotes a chapter of his book (chapter 8) to what he calls ‘the reform 
of popular culture’, that is, ‘the systematic attempt by some of the educated 
... to change the attitudes and values of the rest of the population’ (207) and 
the attacks to those attitudes and values carried on by the reformers, in the 
‘attempt to suppress, or at least purify, many items of traditional popular 
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culture’ (208). It is therefore true to say that these epochal changes, apart 
from determining this progressive withdrawal and division, also represented 
an attack on the vitality of popular culture. As a paradigmatic figure of the 
growing distance between the people and the elite and of the contraction of 
the people’s cultural spaces, Burke evokes the transformation and correlative 
loss of function which can be observed in one of the main cultural mediators 
in the Middle Ages and in early modern culture: ‘The old-style parish priest 
who wore a mask and danced in church at festivals and made jokes in the 
pulpit was replaced by a new-style priest who was better-educated, higher in 
social status, and considerably more remote from his flock’ (271). 
Piero Camporesi, in turn, discusses the ways in which, in the Catholic 
context, the Counter-Reformation deleted the folkloric elements from church 
rituals. In the context of reformed ritualism he sees ‘the end of all the cultural 
elements which had been self-managed from below’ and at the same time ‘the 
birth of the monstrous formula of mass culture’. ‘The victory of Lent and the 
final defeat of Carnival’, he argues, ‘the triumph of capitalist ethics and of a 
new relationship with money, the inevitable surfacing of new ideologies and of 
a different work organization modified and narrowed the cultural and existen-
tial space of the people’ (1991, 54). His idea is that ‘the Counter-reformation 
tightening contributed to dig an ever deeper furrow between the little and 
the great tradition which quickly recoiled from the forms of folklore culture, 
by then heavily branded by the negative and demonizing mark engraved on 
its “superstitious habits”, its “vain beliefs”, its “diabolical remedies” ’ (88). It 
is interesting to note that, when discussing the same process of estrangement 
between the ‘two cultures’ and the correlative loss of liberty and vitality on 
the part of the culture from below illustrated by Burke, Camporesi evokes 
the same paradigmatic figure evoked by Burke in the passage quoted above: 
the parish priest who had represented the driving force for popular culture, 
he says, lost his function. For centuries this figure had represented 
the co-existence of old and new; paganism and Christianity, the profane and the 
sacred, the oral and the written, the alternative of life and death, rebirth and return 
were embodied in the same full-blooded person in charge of the great rites of passage 
of the community (birth, marriage, death) ... Nearly all the names of these cultural 
mediators, indefatigable promoters of ‘low’ dramaturgy, have been deleted by the joint 
action of centuries, of the irreversible social mutations, of the voluntary omission of 
the High Church. (88-89; my translation here and above) 
Bakhtin is fully conscious of the genuinely popular source of certain forms of 
‘low dramaturgy’, of the difference implied in the alternative created by/created 
for and, consequently, of the fact that in some social practices an active role 
can be attributed only to the senders when, discussing the creative nature of 
carnival and the involvement of all those who take part in it, excludes from 
this experience precisely the role of ‘receiver’ or ‘spectator’ as being a non-role:
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... carnival does not know footlights, in the sense that it does not acknowledge any 
distinction between actors and spectators. Footlights would destroy a carnival, as 
the absence of footlights would destroy a theatrical performance. Carnival is not a 
spectacle seen by the people; they live in it, and everyone participates because its very 
idea embraces all the people. (1984, 7)16
Equally conscious of the relevance of the alternative created by/created for was 
Antonio Gramsci who, in his reflections on popular songs quotes a classification 
suggested by Ermolao Rubieri between those composed by the people and for 
the people, those composed for the people but not by the people and ‘those com-
posed neither by the people nor for the people but adopted by the people because 
they were in harmony with their way of thinking and feeling’. He comments on 
Rubieri’s classification saying that ‘all popular songs can and must be reduced to 
the third category, because what characterizes them, within the framework of a 
nation and its culture, is neither the artistic dimension nor the historical origin, 
but the way in which this culture conceives the world and life, in opposition to 
official society’. Gramsci seems to militate on the side of the popular ‘adoption’ 
of forms formulated elsewhere (by the hegemonic culture) and to envisage an 
adoption (or appropriation) performed on the basis of the people’s ‘way of con-
ceiving the world and life, in opposition to official society’. In other words, he 
seems to attribute to users both the previous possession of a cultural heritage of 
values and world views of their own and an oppositional intent. Then, from these 
observations, he passes on to more general reflections: ‘in this and only in this’, 
he says, ‘the “collective” character of popular songs and of the people itself is to be 
found. From this, other criteria for research on folklore derive: that the people are 
not a homogeneous cultural collectivity, but consist of numerous cultural layers, 
variously combined, which cannot always be identified with particular historical 
groups’ (1975, I, 679-680; my translation here and above). 
4. Differences: Sources, Transmission, Texts
The last issue I wish to discuss is that of ‘difference’ and the various senses in 
which this idea seems to me to be relevant to any discourse about popular 
culture. The basic consideration, that has long since become part of undis-
puted shared knowledge, is that we should consider, even within the same 
temporal and geographical context, the various configurations of phenom-
ena at a micro-level and speak of ‘cultures’ rather than ‘culture’. Tim Harris 
(1995) has discussed at length the necessity to ‘unpack’ the notion of popular 
culture precisely in view of an acknowledgement of the many ways in which 
it is manifested according to the subjects who express it and the conditions 
in which it is expressed. However, while the acknowledgement of diversity 
in time and contexts is universally affirmed in theory and practised in case 
studies, it seems to me that its general methodological implications for the 
analyst deserve further reflection.
32 paola pugliatti
Once we accept the idea of micro-level variety within a certain context, 
we encounter the issue of macro-level differences between different contexts. 
As argued by Barry Reay in a passage quoted above, ‘the representations of the 
early modern culture that we have lost are light years away from the consumer 
cultures of late-twentieth-century popular culture’ (1998, 223). It is indeed 
obvious to say that, when reflecting on issues of early modern culture, we are 
engaged with phenomena of a completely different nature, with a world organ-
ized on the basis of a completely different economic and social structure, with 
different sets of values, aspirations and interests, with a different diffusion and 
concentration of literacy, with different power relations and power structures 
than those we encounter when dealing with post-industrial contexts. 17 Indeed, 
this difference is arguable not simply because in one case we are engaged with 
issues which are temporally removed from us and that therefore we are not in 
the ideal situation illustrated by Stuart Hall, that is, ‘in a period which poses 
the same kind of interpretive problems as our own’ (1981, 231); and not 
simply because, in the latter case, the risk of anachronism is much reduced. 
Indeed, the difference in contexts, problems and representations also concerns 
the kind of ‘texts’ we can rely on as ‘sources’, the different genres to which the 
sparse documents the archives and libraries have handed down to us belong 
and also the different ways of diffusion and transmission of forms and models; 
and those differences imply the adoption of distinct paradigms of analysis and 
ways of reading. Trying to imagine, explain and provide evidence about what, 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, led groups of women, throughout 
Europe, to ‘confess’ witchcraft and doing it by reading the ‘evidence’ provided 
by apparently tendentious court records is not the same as studying the strategy 
and rhetoric of confession of some of the accused in the extensively recorded 
proceedings of the Nuremberg Trials. ‘Different problems’, Burke says, ‘require 
different methods of response’; and ‘New sources ... require their own forms 
of source criticism’ (2008, 117, 116). Translated into the language of literary 
criticism, different texts impose different methods of (close) reading. 
One of the diversities which have been discussed concerns a problem of 
dating and continuity of phenomena and forms, which exists for the products 
of popular culture in the past and much less for the commercial products of 
the late modern age. Roman Jakobson and Petr Bogatyrev, commenting on 
what distinguishes the idea of ‘birth’ of a literary work from the same idea 
when a folklore ‘work’ is recorded, say that ‘the work belongs to folklore only 
from the moment it is adopted by the community’. The analogy with the 
Saussurian concepts of langue and parole appears once more apt to explain 
the difference: ‘Just as individual neologisms cannot be considered changes 
in the given lauguage (la langue, in the Saussurian sense) until they have 
entered into general usage, and thereby have become socialized, likewise a 
folklore work is only that which has been sanctioned and adopted by a given 
community’ (1971, 91). The same issue about the difficulty of dating the 
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birth of a popular motif whose presence is disclosed at a given moment in 
the past is discussed by Diane Purkiss who says that ‘although it is possible 
to date the moment when a piece of folklore surfaces, in print or in a piece of 
oral storytelling that happens to have been recorded, this is obviously not the 
same as the date when it was composed or created’. Purkiss also remarks that
The situation is further complicated by the difficult interactions between oral culture 
and print in the early modern period. What survives as folklore is often (though not 
invariably) print, and as soon as oral folklore is print, it becomes not the oral folklore 
in which the illiterate early modern public was immersed, but something that exists 
alongside it, in indirect and tangential relation to it. (2006, 140-141)
Purkiss is here outlining the problem of possible (maybe inevitable) distortions 
in the transition from oral to print. 18 A more general problem of mediation is 
highlighted by many historians of early modern culture. It is indeed true to say 
that, generally speaking, early modern documents are much more deeply ques-
tionable as reliable sources than the commercial ‘texts’ (of whatever kind) which 
witness the cultures of the industrial era. Commenting on the reliability of the 
sources, manuscript and printed, used for one of his books, David Cressy says:
These are not necessarily reliable sources, and none is free of problems. Most are heavily 
weighted to the clerical, to the male, and to the literate élite. The immediate circum-
stances that produced them have often faded from view, and even the most generous 
sources leave much of the background opaque ... We know only those cases which came 
to court and for which documentary evidence has survived ... In the rare cases when 
personal testimony survives to amplify the allegation we are faced with problems of 
truth and diction, what had to be said to get the case into court, what had to be said to 
conform the story to the law, and the demands of judicial process. We may choose to 
call this surviving material ‘evidence’, in accord with established historical principles, 
so long as we recognize the mixture of reportage, prescription, book-keeping, special 
pleading, selectivity, and fiction that so often renders evidence intractable. (1997, 7)19
Other voices have expressed similar preoccupations about the reliability of 
early modern (popular) ‘sources’. Tim Harris says that ‘our access to the culture 
of the subordinate classes is ... normally indirect, mediated through sources 
produced by those who belonged to the learned culture of the elite. What 
becomes difficult’, he adds, ‘is to discern the extent to which the historical 
record of this popular culture has been contaminated by these elite mediators’ 
(1995, 6). Commenting on the texts from which we get information about 
Elizabethan criminality, James Sharpe asks himself whether certain descriptions 
of the underworld ‘tell us more about the fears of society, and ultimately of 
the government, than they do of reality’; ‘Popular literature’, he argues, ‘con-
structed a stereotype of the criminal, and convinced the public at large of the 
dreadful consequences of sin for the individual and of the threat posed by the 
underworld to society at large’ (1984, 165, 166). Piero Camporesi is concerned 
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with the sources (mainly the beggar books) which transmitted throughout 
Europe a misleading and deeply biased image of medieval and early modern 
beggars. Those sources, he says, are ‘fantastic, highly unreal, tendentious and 
classist’ and therefore they ‘cannot but transmit an altered, misleading and, in 
the final analysis, factious image of pauperism and mendicity’ (1973, clxxix; 
my translation).20 Carlo Ginzburg expresses the same concern:
Since historians are unable to converse with the peasants of the sixteenth century (and, 
in any case, there is no guarantee that they would understand them), they must depend 
almost entirely on written sources (and possibly archeological evidence). These are 
doubly indirect for they are written, and written in general by individuals who were 
more or less openly attached to the dominant culture. This means that the thoughts, 
the beliefs, and the aspirations of the peasants and artisans of the past reach us (if 
and when they do) almost always through distorting viewpoints and intermediaries. 
At the very outset this is enough to discourage attempts at such research.
Ginzburg also establishes a difference which is relevant to his perspective, say-
ing that ‘the terms of the problem are drastically altered when we propose to 
study, not “culture produced by the popular classes”, but rather “culture imposed 
on the popular classes” ’. As an example of the risks implied in confusing the 
two perspectives, Ginzburg quotes Robert Mandrou who, he believes, when 
examining the so called ‘literature of colportage’ (booklets, almanacs, ballads, 
proverbs, etc.), equated ‘ “the culture produced by the popular classes” with 
“the culture imposed on the masses” ’; Mandrou, Ginzburg argues, failed 
to acknowledge that those booklets, almanacs, ballads, etc., were products 
imposed on the people; that, far from being ‘escapist’, they were ‘deliberately 
intended for the masses’. Consequently, he missed an important point, that 
is, that the intention of that imposition was to prevent ‘those whom it affected 
from becoming aware of their own social and political conditions’ (1980, xv). 
Here we encounter again the alternative created by/created for; and, again, 
we meet the reflection of Chartier who, discussing the same kind of cheap 
literature, expresses doubts – although of a different kind – about Mandrou’s 
treatment of the issue. His criticism is twofold: on the one hand, he challenges 
the idea that the so-called literature of colportage and other cheap print (in 
France mainly the so-called Bibliothèque bleue) was, as argued by Mandrou, 
meant ‘essentially for popular usage’ for, he argues, the readership of the Bi-
bliothèque bleue was ‘a public made up in the city of merchants and wealthy 
artisans and, in the countryside, of low-ranking officials and the richer farm-
ers and laborers’ (1984, 231). On the other hand, Chartier also challenges 
the idea that spiritual models and reading matter, even though suggested 
or imposed from above, were accepted passively, i.e. without ‘adaptations, 
trespassing, and subversion’ (233). The leading idea is, again, that ‘What 
distinguishes cultural worlds is different kinds of use and different strategies 
of appropriation’ (235-236).
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In spite of all subtle – and convincingly argued – assumptions about 
appropriation, usage and the active role which, on certain occasions and 
stimulated by certain objects, receivers may [have] take[n] up, I still believe that 
the difference posited by Ginzburg as well as the dual (popular/elite) model 
should not be abandoned. ‘Whatever the later modifications or clarifications’, 
Barry Reay says, ‘bipolarity fixes the conceptual boundaries’: the problem, 
with Chartier’s analysis, is that, unlike the bi-polar model,
The model of appropriation ... will go directly to the form – let us say, chapbooks or 
festivals – or to a particular example without assuming prior social categorisation. 
This mode of analysis may indeed find that a polarity (of some sort) applies, but it 
will be more attuned to multiple uses and less likely merely to confirm something 
that has already been decided ... The search for commonalty, in less subtle hands, 
could easily distort or erase important cultural cleavages. (1998, 201)
5. ... and Shakespeare
The most radical dismissal of official sources as reliable ‘evidence’ I have come 
across is that of Christopher Hill. Discussing the struggle for constitutional 
liberty in England from the point of view ‘of those who had no share in mak-
ing laws, who were legislated against’, Hill says: ‘We get a lot of information 
from state papers, Parliamentary speeches and the correspondence of the 
gentry – the traditional sources for historians’. He adds, however, his evalu-
ation of these sources: ‘I have a certain scepticism here. We have learnt from 
recent experience that most state papers are works of fiction; at best they make 
assumptions which it is difficult for us to recover now’. Then, very aptly for 
the argument of this article and of those which follow in this volume, he 
evaluates the possibility of resorting to other kinds of sources: ‘Might not 
ballads, plays and other popular literary forms neglected by real historians 
provide fresh insight?’ Hill soon puts the idea into practice by examining 
Richard Brome’s play A Jovial Crew (published in 1652, but first staged about 
ten years before), a text which he considers only ‘at first sight ... an escapist 
utopian fantasy’ (1996, 4). 
The whole book is inspired, for its historical analyses, by literary and 
paraliterary texts (plays, ballads, sermons, political tracts, pamphlets, etc.); and 
uses them to construct an interpretation of the struggles of the meaner sort 
during the years of the seventeenth-century English revolution; the actors in 
this struggle are, in Hill’s text, a mixed bag of beggars, highway men, gypsies, 
religious dissenters, free thinkers, poor villagers, pirates, smugglers, poachers, etc. 
By deconstructing the title of his book, Liberty Against the Law, we encounter 
its main questions: ‘liberty for whom?’ and ‘the law made by whom?’ Hill tries 
to recover the people’s attitudes towards Parliament and the idea of liberty it 
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enforced (which, he argues, was liberty for the legislating class of landowners 
and wealthy merchants) and to construct, from below, the voice of those who 
were ‘legislated against’ and their idea of ‘liberty’ which, he maintains, was liberty 
from the law. In the texts which he uses in support of his argument, he tries to 
find these voices, evaluations, needs and aspirations. It would be easy to contend 
that even those texts which are constructed as representing the point of view of 
the people were not written by the people, and therefore did not represent the 
people’s authentic voice. But those texts which profess to record, and provide 
evidence for, ‘truth’ are, in the opinion of many historians, also unreliable or 
even, as Hill says, fictional. The difference between fiction and document may, 
therefore, in the final analysis, be only quantitative; and, although to read history 
by resorting to works of fiction is certainly a risky practice, at least, when reading 
literature, we are equipped with a set of tried and tested procedures and know 
how to remove filters whose presence and nature are apparent. Thus, fortified 
by the historian’s opinion, we finally find ourselves vis-à-vis Shakespeare and 
his texts’ relationship with popular culture. 
Hill quotes Shakespeare several times – on some occasions as a member 
of a popular class or as friend of some dissenter and on others discussing his 
texts’ stance towards the lower classes which, he believes, was sympathetic; he 
evokes Shakespeare’s representation of sylvan liberty (in the symbolic context 
of the forest of Arden, for instance) and some of his texts’ adherence to themes 
of ‘Robin Hoodism’; he also calls forth the mention of Gypsy proverbial 
phrases, or the idea of insubordination which we meet in The Tempest; and 
argues that ‘In Henry VI, King Lear and Coriolanus Shakespeare captured the 
mood of the poor during the hungry years of 1590s and the following decade’ 
and maintains that, in King Lear, Shakespeare shows he had ‘an eye for social 
injustice, though for the benefit of the censor his most forceful passages are 
given to the mad Lear, speaking for society’s outcasts’ (256). 
Although he deals with Shakespeare in a fragmentary way, Hill’s position 
appears clearly to be in harmony with the idea of those professional Shake-
speare critics who believe that Shakespeare’s plays, to a certain extent, do allow 
the recovery of his opinions about ‘the people’ and his attitude towards them. 
The issue is one of the thorniest in the development of Shakespeare criticism: 
should we talk of Shakespeare or of ‘Shakespeare’; and – if we choose to talk 
of Shakespeare – can we comment on his ideas or on what his texts suggest? 
And how does this alternative influence the issue of authorship? Furthermore, 
among those who believe that Shakespeare’s ideas can, to a certain extent, be 
recovered or reconstructed starting from his works, the description of his stance 
presents diametrically opposed evaluations: from those who, like Coleridge, 
style him ‘a philosophical aristocrat’, a conservative and a hater of the people 
(differently called populace, mob, crowd, etc.) to those who, like Hill, are 
convinced of his concern for society’s outcasts. And there is also a third pos-
sibility, that of opting for the opinion of another romantic poet, John Keats, 
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and embrace his idea of ‘negative capability’, that is, of absolute neutrality and 
aloofness. From time to time, confutations of one or all of these perspectives 
emerge, and the whole field of Shakespeare studies is revised and restructured 
according to some universally embraced (new) critical convention, or better, 
according to a new silent covenant. Today the universally accepted covenant is 
stipulated on the basis of the ideas of ‘afterlife’ and of media ‘appropriation’.21 
Going against the grain of critical and theoretical subjection and con-
formism, I wish to reaffirm an old covenant, that of a kind of literary criticism 
which keeps an eye on history. With Hill’s book, we encounter the recipro-
cal gesture of a social historian who keeps an eye on literature in a ‘militant’ 
form: a thoughtful and unprejudiced gesture since, as Peter Burke says, ‘Cul-
tural history is not a monopoly of historians. It is multidisciplinary as well 
as interdisciplinary; in other words, it starts from different places, different 
departments in the universities – as well as being practised outside academe’. 
Historians, then, should not recoil from reading – among other things – liter-
ary texts; for, Burke adds, ‘From literary critics, cultural historians can learn 
the “close reading” of texts’ (2008, 135). Texts, yes, and their ‘close reading’. 
This is how literary critics can give a hand to social historians. After all, one 
of the major and, I believe, more lasting conquests of twentieth-century 
literary theory is the idea that each text creates the competence of its reader 
by selecting, imposing and even inventing the methods and instruments for 
its analysis (Eco 1979). 
1 For an exhaustive survey of the development of cultural history and its different perspec-
tives, see Burke 2008; a concise but useful survey is Arcangeli 2007.
2 Stephen Wilson comments on the ambiguity of the term ‘popular’ in English, saying: 
‘ “popular”, in English is at the superficial level simply ambiguous. It means both “widely liked 
or followed” and also “to do with the people”. In French or Italian of course this particular 
confusion does not exist but it is introduced at once when the equivalent terms are translated’. 
He then adds: ‘The ambiguity in English, less acute in common than in academic parlance, 
conveys an opinion. What is “widely liked or followed” is almost certainly “to do with the 
people”. And by implication what is rare, unusual must appeal to the more discerning upper 
strata of society’ (1989, 517).
3 For a discussion of the Gramscian notion of hegemony, see Reay 1985, 18-21. E.P. 
Thompson builds his discussion of power relationships in eighteenth-century English society 
on the idea of hegemony (1974). Many texts discussing issues of popular culture allude to the 
idea of ‘hegemony’ or the dominant/subordinate dichotomy, although the passages quoted 
are usually taken out of their contexts – understandably, because, as is well known, Gramsci’s 
thought is dispersed in hundreds of fragments in his prison copybooks, and the topics must 
be retrieved by recourse to the whole work. It is surprising, however, that Gramsci’s reflections 
on folklore are usually not quoted by social historians discussing issues of popular culture. An 
exception is Wiseman 2009.
4 Burke says that the field of cultural studies is a ‘loosely defined area’ (1994, xv).
5 In the footnote appended to this sentence, Reay comments: ‘There are two related issues 
here: the elision of early modern history and the elision of history. The discipline of history was 
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central to what can be seen as early cultural study, but it was nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
history’ (n. 94, 221). Stuart Gillespie and Neil Rhodes, introducing the book they edited on 
Shakespeare and Elizabethan Popular Culture, say that ‘The term “popular culture” is likely 
nowadays to suggest Hollywood and the TV soap, games shows and fast food outlets – com-
mercialized leisure activities designed for mass consumption. These are indeed cultural products 
created for the people, but they are not of the people, which is an older meaning of the term 
“popular”. Older forms of popular culture were for the most part not specifically commercial 
activities, and may be understood as the cultural expressions of the people themselves’ (2006, 
1). I wish to point out that The Cambridge Companion to Shakespeare and Popular Culture 
(Shaughnessy, ed., 2007b) published essays by various scholars almost exclusively devoted to 
Shakespeare’s afterlife; in the words of the editor, to the ‘reinvention, adaptation, citation, and 
appropriation of the plays ... across a wide range of media in subsequent periods and cultures’ (1).
6 That Shakespeare’s plays (obviously much less his poems) are often called ‘popular’ in 
the sense that the audience which attended theatrical events was a mixed audience, that they 
were greatly enjoyed and represented an extremely lucrative box office business belongs to an 
entirely different set of considerations. 
7 Levine was the author of an innovative and influential book on Afro-American culture 
(Black Culture and Black Consciousness, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978).
8 Tin Pan Alley is the name given to a New York industry of music publishers active 
from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the 1930s. I am not going to embark 
on a discussion of the distinct meanings which some historians give to ‘popular culture’ and 
‘mass culture’. I will only quote two definitions which show different ways in which the two 
concepts have been considered. The first one, quoted by Peter Burke, is by Dwight Macdonald. 
Burke argues that ‘Literary critics and sociologists have tended to operate with two opposed 
models of popular culture, “Folk” And “Mass’’ ’ and quotes Macdonald’s definition: ‘Folk art 
grew from below. It was a spontaneous, autochthonous expression of the people, shaped by 
themselves ... to suit their own needs. Mass culture is imposed from above. It is fabricated by 
technicians hired by businessmen; its audiences are passive consumers’ (Burke 1985, 32; the 
source from which the definition comes is Against the American Grain, New York, Random 
House, 1962). The second, formulated almost sixty years later, is by Michael Pickering: ‘I regard 
popular culture’, he says, ‘as a valid term that is theoretically sustainable and worth working 
with as a keyword in media and cultural analysis. While I regard mass culture as an invalid 
term and not theoretically sustainable, we still need to think about it as a means for analytically 
distinguishing between different forms of popular culture’ (2010, xxvii). 
9 David Hall remarks that ‘Natalie Davis has been especially insistent that the people 
were not passive ciphers; even if the people learned from clergy and their like, the process of 
consumption was a process of revision’ (1984, 11). The reference is to Davis 1974.
10 Volume 2 of L’invention du quotidien, written with Luce Girard and Pierre Mayol and 
part of the same research project, is entitled Habiter, cuisiner . 
11 An unorthodox use of written materials is documented by Adam Fox in his study of 
literacy in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England. ‘The Elizabethan preacher Nicholas 
Bownd’, Fox says, ‘observed the way in which the common people bought broadside ballads 
and set them up in their cottages and shops even if they themselves could not read’ (2000, 
9). The use which in this case was made of the ballads, which were probably on display on 
the mantelpiece, was either aesthetic, or maybe the written sheets were set up and shown to 
visitors as proof of literacy. The text quoted is Nicholas Bownd, The Doctrine of the Sabbath 
Plainely Layde Forth, London 1595, 242.
12 Peter Burke said that he considers ‘the analysis of the creative uses of objects ... the 
most important contribution to the popular culture debate in the last fifteen years’ (1994, xxi). 
13 An often quoted corpus is that of the so-called livrets bleus, a term which designates 
the popular publications on various topics published in France between the seventeenth and 
the nineteenth centuries. On these publications, see Burke 1981 and Chartier 1984. On chap-
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books, which can be considered the English equivalent of the livrets bleus, see Newcomb 2009.
14 There probably are different modalities of the disappearance of the active production 
of culture on the part of the people and of the advent of their more passive role; different 
processes which develop in the short durée and which are connected to a mixture of taste, 
habits, profit, convictions and other cultural factors. Peter Burke argues that with the profes-
sionalization of Elizabethan and Jacobean London theatrical entertainment ‘the role of the 
audience was becoming more passive’; however, he also recalls that, starting in the first decades 
of the seventeenth century, a contrary process developed since an active and creative role of 
the people was affirmed inside the separatist congregations which expressed ‘alternative forms 
of Christianity’ (1985, 41-43; 43). On certain popular traits of seventeenth-century radical 
religious movements see also Capp 1989.
15 As Tim Harris acknowledges, ‘much of the specific scholarly work into various aspects 
of popular culture in early modern England seems to confirm Burke’s picture’; in particular, 
‘the transforming effect of social and economic changes, such as the divisive impact of the 
spread of literacy, the commercialisation of society, the impact of the Scientific Revolution, 
and the rise of a culture of manners which caused the elite to withdraw from what they saw 
as the “uncouth” practices of the lower classes’ (1995, 2, 1). 
16 To further illustrate the alternative ‘culture by the people/culture for the people’, we may 
recall Roman Jakobson’s communication model (Jakobson 1960) which lists at its extremes 
a ‘sender’ and a ‘receiver’; and, by unduly simplifying the issues involved, say that in post-
industrial, commercial and urban contexts the people are fatally (and intentionally) relegated to 
the role of ‘receiver’, although of ‘active receiver’, as Certeau and Chartier have argued. But, in 
Jacobson’s model, the poetic function (the function of poiēsis) is consubstantial to the message 
formulated by the sender. The sender may assume the role of innovator, while the receiver is 
somebody (or some mechanism) designed for the sole reception, however active this may be.
17 Commenting on the difficulty ‘to separate not simply conceptions of popular and 
elite culture, but also to determine exactly which is which’, Matthew Dimmock and Andrew 
Hadfield say: ‘It is relatively easy to see such conflicts in contemporary culture, because we have 
some sense of where the boundaries lie even if we are aware of the problems of defining and 
policing them. Delving into the historical archive can often be more confusing’ (2009, 2, 3). In 
the Introduction to his study of Rabelais, Bakhtin often comments on the misunderstandings 
and critical anachronisms generated by the fact that the whole culture of folk humour in the 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance has been described according to alien visions of laughter. He 
speaks of these anachronistic readings and the consequent ‘modernization of laughter’ (1984, 
45) and says that by the romantics and by subsequent generations ‘The element of laughter 
was accorded the least place of all in the vast literature devoted to myth, to folk lyrics, and 
to epics. Even more unfortunate was the fact that the peculiar nature of the people’s laughter 
was completely distorted; entirely alien notions and concepts of humor, formed within the 
framework of bourgeois modern culture and aesthetics, were applied to this interpretation’ (4).
18 On the distortions produced by ‘the inevitable mediation’ in the transmission of orig-
inally oral discourses through written texts, see Lamb 2006, 11.
19 In the essay published in this volume (47-62), Cressy reconsiders the problem of media-
tion both in general and in the specific light of recovering the ‘voices’ of early modern people 
in Shakespeare’s works. The issue of the inevitable mediation – even when the people’s voices 
are registered in courtrooms – is also present both in Pallotti’s (211-239) and in Baratta’s (185-
208) articles in this volume. Discussing the social composition of litigants between 1560 and 
1700 on the basis of existing evidence, James Sharpe says that ‘Details of occupation as given 
in legal records can be unreliable’; but he adds that ‘if we may discount a deliberate conspiracy 
by the clerical staff of courts to mislead modern historians, it would seem that both litigants 
and witnesses at courts were drawn mainly from the middling to lower ranks of society, from 
men and women of moderate or small property’ (1985, 252). An extensive discussion of the 
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adequacy of sources we use in the study of early modern history in general is Scribner 1989.
20 On the representations of mendicity in early modern European beggar books see 
Pugliatti 2003, especially Part Three.
21 One of the books which authoritatively contested a critical doxa established starting in the 
1980s, that of new historicism, deals precisely with Shakespeare and ‘the people’. Shakespeare and the 
Popular Voice by Annabel Patterson (1989) boldly contested ‘the avant-garde proscriptions against 
talking about authors and intentions’ and returned to ‘certain categories of thought that some have 
declared obsolete: above all the concept of authorship, which itself depends on our predicating a 
continuous, if not a consistent self, of self-determination and, in literary terms, of intention’. Pat-
terson, then, argues the possibility ‘of positing Shakespeare as a writer whose intentions, if never fully 
recoverable, are certainly worth debating’ (4-5). The 1980s avant-garde prescriptions dictated by 
‘new historicism’ included Greenblatt’s subversion/containment paradigm of Gramscian derivation, 
which was a most consequential idea to any consideration of popular culture.
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